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Evidence by the Video Method
George Fisher
“Imagine,” says the law professor—and her students tune out.
After all, they know what’s coming. Imagine is their clue. That word alerts 
them their professor is spinning a classroom hypothetical, challenging them to 
apply their legal learning to imagined “facts” from life.
Yet students know the difference between the great wide world and 
their professor’s cloistered imagination. And they seem to resent carefully 
crafted hypotheticals and the professor’s hidden hand guiding them toward 
supposedly spontaneous moments of intellectual discovery. So they tune out.
Video clips offer a better choice. Unlike classroom hypotheticals, they don’t 
seem contrived for pedagogical purposes. Whether fact or fiction, the scenarios 
they present did not spring from the teacher’s crafty imagination. And unlike 
casebook problems assigned in advance, video clips don’t divide the class into 
leaders and laggards, those prepared for class and those not. Everyone sees the 
clip together—and while some students will have a tighter grip on the relevant 
law, all students receive the relevant facts at once.
What’s more, those facts aren’t flagged for importance. It’s hard for a teacher 
to spin out a hypothetical without dropping errant hints about which facts 
count most. As the filmmaker’s mission normally has nothing in common with 
the professor’s, critical facts may lie in the corner of the screen or in offhand 
dialogue muttered under the characters’ breath. 
And video clips—at least most of them—are simply fun. They break up class. 
They keep the professor from droning on. And they breathe life into the law’s 
arid abstractions.
I. Choosing and Editing the Clips
Like a well-crafted hypothetical, a well-chosen video clip challenges 
students to think. So the best clips are not simply entertainment. Diverting as 
they may be, they are part of the teaching, not a distraction from it. And the 
best clips don’t merely show lawyers in action. Instead, they prompt students 
to think and speak as lawyers.
Hence the clips typically should be brief. They are a classroom tool, 
intended to generate and structure the conversation, not a substitute for class. 
Now and then a clip might cast so much light on a consequential point as to 
justify several minutes of classroom time. But a minute or two normally is 
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enough. Just as a photo displaces a thousand words, a minute of video can 
convey whole paragraphs of a written hypothetical.
Though legal movies and TV shows, whether fictional or true life, are rich 
sources of classroom clips, there’s no need for law to intrude in a classroom 
video. Applying law to life is what lawyers do. Having projected a scene from 
life, therefore, the teacher can call on students to wrap the law they’ve studied 
around on-screen facts. Of course, legal clips can serve a purpose. Many issues 
of courtroom procedure, trial strategy, witness impeachment, and evidence 
handling are hard to explore outside the courtroom context. And courtroom 
clips, if well made, can teach as much about lawyerly deportment as they do 
about substantive law. 
II. Using Clips in Class
An extra advantage of teaching with video clips is that the teacher can 
absolve students of speaking in their own voice. A typical clip sets up a dispute 
between two courtroom advocates. So before running the clip, the teacher 
can appoint two student advocates. The first, ignorant of the facts, chooses 
whether to prosecute or defend. The second, equally ignorant, must oppose. 
Their peers plainly see these students aren’t voicing their own views, but are 
speaking for assumed clients. This role-distancing can be useful, as student 
advocates tend to be more willing than students in general to take unpopular 
positions. Normally the teacher can reserve for herself the role of judge, as 
student judges don’t always press student advocates to sharpen their points. 
But whenever a limiting instruction is needed, a third student can play judge 
and deliver an instruction to the class, sitting collectively as jurors. 
After running a clip, the teacher lobs questions to student advocates. Some 
questions may be simple—“State your client’s strongest case.” Some questions 
must bridge the gap between Hollywood fiction and classroom fodder 
by adding facts or refining issues. And sometimes the teacher must enact a 
courtroom scene based on on-screen facts and frame questions based on that 
enacted scene. I explore some of these approaches below.
Teaching by the video method works in almost every realm of law. Evidence 
is my usual gig, and I focus here on using clips in evidence class. But I’ve 
taught criminal procedure by the same technique, and prosecutorial ethics 
too. Elsewhere in this issue Phil Meyer and Catlin Davis describe using video 
clips when teaching first-year criminal law and legal storytelling,1 Felice Batlan 
and Joshua Bass explain the use of pop-culture materials in teaching business 
1. Philip N. Meyer & Caitlin Davis, Law Students Go to the Movies II: Using Clips from Classic 
“Hollywood” Movies to Teach Criminal Law and Legal Storytelling to First-Year Law Students, 68 J. LegaL 
educ. 37 (2018). 
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associations,2 and Naomi Mezey considers the technique in teaching civil 
procedure.3 We could multiply examples across the law school curriculum.
III. A Few Clips in Action
To explore this teaching tool, let’s take up three evidence-related clips. One 
depicts real life; two are Hollywood make-believe. One shows a courtroom 
scene, the others scenes from life. All three clips happen to address domestic 
discord. Together they let us try out a range of teaching techniques.
A. Character Evidence: People v. James Dailey4
Some years back a TV crew set up camp in the San Diego District Attorney’s 
Office. Together with Dick Wolf, filmmaker Bill Guttentag produced three 
seasons of Crime & Punishment, a reality show that shadowed prosecutors as they 
visited crime scenes, scouted out witnesses, and laid their evidence before a 
jury. Though every word was real, the series adopted the dramatic conventions 
and staccato styling of Wolf’s flagship Law & Order franchise.
The prosecutor who pursued James Dailey for the murder of his wife in the 
show’s inaugural episode had a problem: He had no body. The defendant’s 
wife simply had vanished, and the defense planned to argue she slipped town, 
fearing she was pregnant with another man’s baby. The prosecution theorized 
that Dailey, who owned a boat, dumped his wife’s body at sea. But forensic 
analysis of the boat turned up no trace of blood and no sign of struggle.
Hoping to salvage a weak case, the prosecutor calls a witness who knows 
nothing of the missing wife, but all too much of Dailey’s character. Her chilling 
testimony, presented in this clip, starts calmly enough. The prosecutor asks if 
she knows the defendant and sees him in court. Twice she answers yes. “When 
did you first meet him?” the prosecutor asks. Ignoring this simple question, 
the witness hesitates: “May I—excuse me—may I have the trash can close to 
me?” The judge looks up, bewildered. The prosecutor stammers:“Sure, OK. 
Are you not feeling well?” When the witness answers no, he stammers again: 
“OK. All right. OK. All right. Matter of fact, ma’am, if—if you feel ill, tell us 
and we’ll take a break, OK?”
Soon we learn the source of the witness’s nausea. “During your relationship 
with the defendant,” the prosecutor asks, “did the defendant make threats to 
you?” Yes, she says—he’d done so often. He had warned that if she ever was 
unfaithful to him, “[h]e would torture me, take me somewhere to the forest, 
find a cave, some isolated area where I would be tortured and left for dead. 
Or if I was lucky he would come back and give me some water. But he would 
make sure I would be tortured.” The witness spoke without emotion, as if 
2. Felice Batlan and Joshua Bass, Beyond Greed Is Good: Pop Culture in the Business Law Classroom, 68 
J. LegaL educ. 23 (2018). 
3. Naomi J. Mezey, Teaching Images, 68 J. LegaL educ. 74 (2018). 
4. Crime & Punishment: People v. James Dailey (NBC television broadcast June 23, 2002).
Evidence by the Video Method
18 Journal of Legal Education
afraid to revisit her former terror. Her accented English gave “tortured” three 
syllables, making the word especially sinister.
After showing the clip, I pause to let it sink in. By this point in the course 
students are familiar with the character evidence ban of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404. They know the rule forbids evidence of conduct when offered 
to prove character and action “in accordance with the character.” Till now, 
however, the students haven’t seen a violation of the rule. This clip makes 
plain one of the chief dangers prompting the rule—that jurors, outraged by 
a defendant’s past acts, will punish him for those acts even if unsure of his 
present guilt. After all, I ask the class, would you be content to let this man 
rejoin society?
Student defenders therefore have little difficulty in stating and supporting 
an objection to this testimony. Rule 404(b)(1) bans evidence of “other act[s]” 
(here Dailey’s past threats) to prove his character (here as a serial abuser) to 
show he acted “in accordance with the character” in killing his wife.
Student prosecutors face a far harder task when asked to justify admission 
of the witness’s testimony. Some venture to argue that Dailey’s past threats to 
abduct and torture his old girlfriend manifest his hostility toward domestic 
partners, which in turn supplied his motive to kill his wife. Prosecutors note 
that Rule 404(b)(2) permits evidence of other acts when offered “for another 
purpose, such as proving motive . . . .”
Astute defenders, however, see that this argument merely reframes forbidden 
claims about Dailey’s character. A desire to abuse domestic partners is unlike, 
say, a desire to avenge a particular slight. The latter we call a motive, for it 
impels a specific act and then often dissolves. But an abiding impulse to abuse 
romantic partners, which finds expression against successive partners, is not a 
mere motive but something we typically call a character trait. Proof of such a 
trait to show action in accordance with the trait is not “another purpose” under 
Rule 404(b)(2), but precisely what Rule 404(b)(1) forbids.
Unfortunately for student prosecutors, there simply is no good response 
to the defense objection. The witness’s testimony finds no legitimate route of 
admission under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Hence this clip of a California 
trial illustrates one of the most striking differences between California and 
federal evidence law. For while Section 1101 of the California Evidence Code 
largely mirrors FRE 404, California lawmakers have enacted an exception 
with no counterpart in the federal rules. Section 1109 provides in part that “in 
a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving 
domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of other domestic 
violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 . . . .” Known as the “Nicole 
Brown Simpson Law,” this provision dates to 1996, when lawmakers sought 
to erase the obstacles faced by O.J. Simpson’s prosecutors in seeking to admit 
evidence of his past assaults on his former wife at his trial for her murder.5
5. See Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 
687, 701-02 (2003); Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson 
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So this brief clip does several things. It challenges students to pose objections 
and parry them creatively, framing arguments that test the boundaries of a 
complex rule. It introduces an important distinction between federal and 
California evidence law. And it gives students a glimpse of a world without 
Rule 404. Without a rule barring propensity evidence, criminal trials might 
devolve into a recital of the defendant’s most sordid deeds. For students who 
doubt the wisdom of rules received from the dead judges of old England, this 
clip permits exploration of another reality.
B. Hearsay: Fatal Attraction6
Not more than sixty seconds long, this clip from Adrian Lyne’s Fatal Attraction 
delivers three challenging hearsay problems wrapped in a deceptively simple 
package.
The clip opens on the most ordinary of domestic scenes. Michael Douglas, 
playing Dan Gallagher, stands in the doorway of his family’s country home 
staring at the heavily falling rain. At length he gathers his courage, quietly 
closes the door, and turns toward his wife. “Honey, we gotta talk,” he says. She 
sits down and watches him with worry.
“Remember the girl who came to the apartment, the one I met in the 
Japanese restaurant?”
“The one with the blond hair,” his wife says softly, her concern mounting. 
Gallagher nods grimly. “You’re scaring me,” she says. Then, pausing, she asks 
the question she fears most. “What is it? Did you have an affair with her?” 
Gallagher’s face is ashen. He hesitates. He answers simply, “Yes.” And there 
the clip stops.
Students realize this can’t end well. Indeed I tell them that a week later 
someone turns up dead, and someone else is charged with murder. Then I 
project three scenarios, one by one, onto the screen. Each scenario features 
a murder trial at which the prosecutor offers evidence of the husband’s 
confession to his wife of his affair. In all three scenarios the defense objects 
on hearsay grounds. I advise students to ignore questions of marital privilege, 
which we’ll take up with the next clip. 
Scenario 1: The other woman is killed; the wife is charged with her murder; the prosecutor 
offers the husband’s testimony about the confession he made to his wife. I remind the student 
prosecutor that the defense has objected to the husband’s testimony on hearsay 
grounds. But a sharp prosecutor will see the evidence is not hearsay at all. The 
prosecutor presumably offers evidence of the husband’s confession to show 
his wife’s motive in killing the other woman. If offered for this purpose, the 
husband’s confession is not coming in for its truth. Even if false, his confession 
could have driven his wife to kill the other woman.
and Beyond, 69 S. caL. L. Rev. 1463, 1473-76 (1996). By the reasoning laid out in People v. Ogle, 
185 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1144 (2010), threatening a girlfriend qualifies under Section 1109 as 
“domestic violence”.
6.  FataL attRactIon (Paramount Pictures Sept. 11, 1987). 
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Scenario 2: The other woman is killed; the husband is charged with her murder; the 
prosecutor offers the wife’s testimony about her husband’s confession. Again I advise the 
student prosecutor that the defense has objected to the wife’s testimony on 
hearsay grounds. Again, though, an alert prosecutor will see the objection 
fails. If offered by the prosecution against the husband, the husband’s 
confession to his wife is admissible as a statement of the opposing party under 
Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or 801(d)(2)(B).
Scenario 3: The husband is killed; the other woman is charged with his murder; the 
prosecutor offers the wife’s testimony about the husband’s confession. This time the student 
prosecutor must work harder in meeting the defendant’s hearsay objection. 
The prosecutor no longer can argue, as in Scenario 1, that the evidence is 
not hearsay. As in Scenario 1, the affair is relevant because it may have given 
the defendant a motive to kill. But now the truthfulness of the husband’s 
confession matters. If the affair (or its termination) gave the other woman a 
motive to kill the husband, there really had to be an affair. If offered to prove 
the affair, the husband’s confession therefore would be hearsay.
But is this hearsay admissible under one or another exception to the hearsay 
rule? The student prosecutor should see the most promising exception is Rule 
804(b)(3) governing statements against interest. The husband’s death satisfies 
the rule’s demand that the declarant be unavailable. And the husband’s 
admission surely was against his interest. No normal spouse would utter such 
a confession unless believing it true. 
The student defender should respond, however, that the rule extends only 
to statements that undermine the speaker’s pecuniary or proprietary interests 
or expose the speaker to civil or criminal liability. Congress specifically 
considered and rejected broadening the rule to embrace statements that 
make the declarant “an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace.” So the usual 
disincentives to confessing an affair to one’s spouse don’t suffice to make such 
a confession a statement against interest under Rule 804(b)(3).
Facing this objection, a clever prosecutor will claim the husband’s confession 
exposed him to the risk of divorce—and hence property division and alimony 
payments and child support and legal fees. Depending on the couple’s 
financial condition, the husband’s confession indeed may have undermined 
his pecuniary and proprietary interests, qualifying it for admission under the 
rule. Even the brief glimpse we have of the couple’s country home shows they 
are people of some wealth, for whom divorce likely would prove financially 
painful.
In the end, then, the prosecutor probably prevails in all three scenarios. 
More importantly, the student advocates endure a drilling on three different 
questions of hearsay law—all driven by less than sixty seconds of film.
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C. Marital Privileges: The Bonfire of the Vanities7
In Brian De Palma’s celluloid recreation of Tom Wolfe’s Bonfire of the Vanities, 
a brief moment of marital tension affords a rich exploration of the spousal 
testimonial privilege and marital confidences privilege.
Playing protagonist Sherman McCoy, Tom Hanks steps out on a rainy 
evening, telling his wife he’s off to walk the dog. Instead we see him squeeze 
into a curbside phone booth with the dog clutched under his dripping 
raincoat. He drops a dime and dials and waits. Then he announces happily, 
“Maria, hello, it’s me!” After an awkward pause, he says, “Oh, sorry, may I 
speak to Maria?”
Now we see that Sherman’s wife, back in their bedroom, has just answered 
the phone. “Sherman?” she says. “Sherman, is that you? Sherman?” Suddenly 
realizing his mistake, Sherman slams down the phone and curses at his own 
stupidity. Collecting his wits and making the best of his mess, he returns home, 
strides into the bedroom, and greets his wife in a tone of breezy innocence. 
Accusingly she asks, “If you want to talk to someone named Maria, why do 
you call me instead?”
I advise students that Maria soon turns up dead, and Sherman is tried for 
her murder. The prosecution seeks to compel his wife’s testimony about the on-
screen events. A series of classroom questions challenges students to apply and 
distinguish the two marital privileges. Under federal evidence law the spousal 
testimonial privilege permits the witness spouse—here the wife—to refuse to 
testify against the defendant spouse on almost any matter in a criminal case. 
The marital confidences privilege permits either spouse in almost any case 
to refuse to disclose (and to bar the disclosure of) any intentionally private 
marital communication.
To organize the discussion, I project a grid onto the overhead screen. 
Across the top it reads “Spousal Testimonial Privilege” on the left and 
“Marital Confidences Privilege” on the right. Down the left margin it asks: (1) 
“Does the privilege apply in civil cases, criminal cases, or both?”; (2) “Who 
may assert the privilege?”; (3) “Does the privilege survive the marriage?”; (4) 
“Does the privilege apply to the phone call?”; (5) “Does the privilege apply to 
the bedroom conversation?”; and (6) “What is the privilege’s rationale?” I ask 
students to supply answers to fill the grid’s boxes.
The trickiest and most fateful question is whether Sherman can prevent his 
wife from testifying about the incriminating phone call, which links him with 
the murdered Maria. As the defendant spouse, he has no power to invoke the 
spousal testimonial privilege. So the issue is whether the marital confidences 
privilege applies to the phone call. If the wife claims the privilege, she likely 
can prevent the call’s disclosure, as she understood almost from the outset 
that she was speaking with her husband in a seemingly private phone call. 
But can Sherman prevent the call’s disclosure if his wife chooses to reveal it? 
Here the answer is likely no. Until the very end of the call Sherman believed 
7.  the BonFIRe oF the vanItIes (Warner Bros. Dec. 21, 1990). 
Evidence by the Video Method
22 Journal of Legal Education
he was speaking with Maria or someone in her apartment. Lacking intent to 
speak confidentially with his wife, he has no marital confidences privilege in 
the contents of the call.
This is a nifty problem made possible by Wolfe’s imagination and De 
Palma’s recreation. A teacher’s attempt to craft this problem in a classroom 
hypothetical likely would end in a clumsy tangle of words. By the time the 
teacher explained Sherman’s horrified discovery of his mistake, the students 
would have either drifted off or seen the problem coming.
IV. Fiction in the Classroom
I confess some discomfort with importing made-up tales into a law school 
classroom. It’s one of the privileges of our profession that we truck in truth. 
Law books are filled with the strange and sometimes horrifying deeds of 
flawed humanity. In asking our students to examine these deeds and debate 
their gravity and weigh the proper societal reaction, we always have the excuse 
of truth. Ugly as the facts may be, they are the facts, and we do our students 
and society no good by shielding them from life’s ugliness.
Importing fictional ugliness into the classroom seems far harder to justify. 
So when the facts are truly ugly—when a woman’s boyfriend threatens to 
torture her in the forest and leave her to die or when a woman calls 911 pleading 
for help as she bleeds to death or when two young men plot their parents’ 
murder—I use only clips from life. It may be hard to look at and listen to those 
clips, but the exercise is never gratuitous, as the law must confront the worst 
that human nature can work.
Still, it’s nice now and then to take a breather from so much reality. And 
though I doubt there’s much pedagogical value in absurdly contrived facts, 
fiction sometimes mirrors reality better than reality itself. After all, how can 
a camera capture a real husband’s confession of an affair or his wayward call 
home while hoping to phone his mistress? If such hard-to-see events give rise 
to challenging legal questions, I’m indebted to the filmmakers who give them 
life.
